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What is Sexual Orientation?
Mary ZieglerI
ABSTRACT

At a time when the Supreme Court seems closer than ever before to treating
sexual orientation as a suspect classification, consideration of the legal definition of
sexual orientation is both timely and important. The Court’s 2015 decision in
Obergefell recognizes two guideposts for defining sexual orientation: its
immutability and normalcy. While other scholars offer rich and nuanced accounts
of the fight for gay, lesbian, transgender, and bisexual rights, they do not fully
analyze the history of sexual orientation as a legal category. This Article closes that
gap, illuminating the hidden costs of the definition of sexual orientation that
Obergefell endorses.
In the past, definitions of sexual orientation based on immutability helped
courts turn away equal protection arguments because of the “real” biological
differences between same-sex and opposite sex couples. In the context of sexual
orientation, arguments based on immutability admit the possibility that other “real”
differences will undermine an otherwise promising equal protection claim,
particularly with respect to reproduction.
Immutability-based definitions also raise the possibility of discrimination on
the basis of conduct. The conduct-status distinction has cropped up as courts weigh
conscience-based objections to otherwise applicable civil rights protections for gays
and lesbians. While conscience claims resting on the conduct-status distinction
have failed so far, the history of sexual orientation as a legal category, together with
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the subject, offers reason for concern. The
Supreme Court has been less willing to equate conduct and status when
discriminators invoke what the courts describe as a legitimate moral or religious
objection to a particular act, like abortion. In describing homosexuality as an
immutable sexual orientation rather than partly as a legitimate choice, the
Obergefell Court assumes the validity of moral objections to both same-sex
marriage and homosexuality. Immutability arguments do not address whether
individuals’ choices deserve respect or tolerance, making it harder to argue against
conscience-based objections. In the aftermath of the Court’s Obergefell decision, it
will be just as important to promote a proper understanding of sexual orientation as
it will to expand antidiscrimination protections.
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INTRODUCTION
At a time when the Supreme Court seems closer than ever before to treating
sexual orientation as a suspect classification, consideration of the legal definition of
sexual orientation is both timely and important.1 The Court’s 2015 decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges recognized two guideposts for defining sexual orientation: its
immutability2 and normalcy.3 The Court thus seems poised to define sexuality in
the terms long championed by the GLBTQ movement.4 However, sexual
orientation as a legal category has a long and troubled history that is mostly missing
from current scholarship. While other scholars offer rich and nuanced accounts of
the fight for gay, lesbian, transgender, and bisexual rights, they offer an incomplete
analysis of the history of sexual orientation as a legal category.5 This Article closes
1
Obergefell did not directly address the question of sexual orientation discrimination, and the
majority’s ruling relied as much on the definition of the fundamental right to marry as on the issue of
sexual orientation discrimination. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle & Tony Mauro, Marriage Ruling Historic,
but Not Final Word on Gay Rights, NAT. L.J., June 29, 2015, 2015
LNSDUID-ALM-NTLAWJ-1202730710519 (available on LexisNexis). On the possibility that the
courts will treat sexual orientation as a suspect classification, see, for example, Lydia DePillis, This Is the
Next Front in the Battle for Gay Rights, WASH. POST, June 26, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/06/26/this-is-the-next-frontier-in-the-battlefor-gay-rights/?utm_term=.8fc5700f9305 [https://perma.cc/876C-9B8F]; Timothy M. Phelps, Next
Frontier for Gays Is Employment and Housing Discrimination, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2015,
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-gays-employment-20150626-story.html [https://perma.cc/T5F8TYHD]; David G. Savage & Timothy M. Phelps, Same-Sex Marriage Ruling Creates New
Constitutional Liberty, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-supremecourt-gay-marriage-decision-20150626-story.html [https://perma.cc/6U8W-8KV7].
2
An immutable characteristic has been defined as “a characteristic that either is beyond the power
of the individual members of the group to change or is so fundamental to their identities or consciences
that it ought not be required to be changed.” In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233–34 (B.I.A. 1985).
3
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015) (describing “sexual orientation [as] both a
normal expression of human sexuality and immutable”).
4
See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (1994) (arguing that “[t]he claim that sexual
orientation is biologically determined has become increasingly salient in legal arguments that lesbians
and gay men comprise a minority population warranting meaningful constitutional protection”); Susan
R. Schmeiser, Changing the Immutable, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1495, 1502–03 (2009) (arguing that
“[c]onservative opponents of LGBT rights tend to argue that homosexuality is nothing more nor less
than a series of behavioral choices[,]” while “[a]dvocates for LGBT rights have seized upon—and
catalyzed—scientific research . . . to contend that homosexuality has a basis in biology or is otherwise
determined by factors outside of individual control”); Edward Stein, Immutability and Innateness
Arguments About Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597, 598 (2014) (stating
that the “general ‘argument from etiology’ for LGB rights—what I call the ‘born that way’ and ‘not a
choice’ arguments—are so popular that dissent from the idea that LGB people’s sexual orientations are
innate and immutable is, in many contexts, treated as tantamount to opposing LGB rights”).
5
For a sample of scholarship on the history of the movement for gay and lesbian rights, see, for
example, MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2009); JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE
MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (3d ed. 2012); JOHN D’EMILIO, SEXUAL
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that gap, illuminating the hidden costs of the definition of sexual orientation that
Obergefell endorses.
The rhetoric of sexual orientation first became prominent during the Cold War,
when paranoia about Communist infiltration of the federal government led to a
moral panic about homosexuals in the State Department.6 Cold warriors borrowed
from an existing psychological dialogue about homosexuality, insisting that
homosexuality was a mental illness.7 Lawmakers incorporated versions of this
definition into the law of immigration and employment discrimination.8
Founded in the 1950s, homophile organizations like the Mattachine Society
and the Daughters of Bilitis (“DOB”) developed the concept of sexual orientation
as an alternative to the view that homosexuality was a mental illness.9 Reasoning
POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED
STATES
1940–1970 (2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES]; VICKI L.
EAKLOR, QUEER AMERICA: A GLBT HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY (2008); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN AMERICA, 1861–2003 (2008);
LILLIAN FADERMAN, THE GAY REVOLUTION: THE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE (2015); MARC
STEIN, RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT (2012) [hereinafter RETHINKING THE
GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT]. Some scholars recognize that the term “sexual preference” once
served as the preferred term among supporters of gay, lesbian, transgender, and queer rights but offer
little explanation of either why this was the case or how sexual orientation as an alternative gained
prominence. See, e.g., DUDLEY CLENDINEN & ADAM NAGOURNEY, OUT FOR GOOD: THE
STRUGGLE TO BUILD A GAY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 265 (1999); JOHN D’EMILIO, THE
WORLD TURNED: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 156–57 (2002) [hereinafter
THE WORLD TURNED: ESSAYS ON GAY HISTORY, POLITICS, AND CULTURE]; Angela M.L.
Pattatucci & Dean H. Hamer, The Genetics of Sexual Orientation: From Fruit Flies to Humans, in
SEXUAL NATURE SEXUAL CULTURE 155 (Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton eds., 1995);
Clark A. Pomerleau, Consorting with the Enemy? Women’s Liberation Rhetoric About Sexuality, in
SEXUAL RHETORICS: METHODS, IDENTITIES, PUBLICS 197 (Jonathan Alexander & Jacqueline
Rhodes eds., 2016); EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND
ETHICS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 41 (1999) [hereinafter MISMEASURE OF DESIRE]. These scholars
touch on the fluidity of legal and political understandings of homosexuality in the twentieth century but
do not focus on its evolution or larger stakes. This Article offers a comprehensive look at the history
only briefly addressed in existing scholarship.
6
On the Cold War anti-gay panic, see, e.g., ROBERT J. CORBER, HOMOSEXUALITY IN COLD
WAR AMERICA: RESISTANCE AND THE CRISIS OF MASCULINITY (1997); George Chauncey, Jr., The
Postwar Sex Crime Panic, in TRUE STORIES FROM THE AMERICAN PAST 160–78 (William Graebner
ed., 1993); John D'Emilio, The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America,
in
PASSION
AND
POWER:
SEXUALITY
IN
HISTORY
226–40
(Kathy
Peiss
& Christina Simmons eds. with Robert A. Padgug, 1989) [hereinafter The Homosexual Menace: The
Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America]; DAVID K. JOHNSON, THE LAVENDER SCARE: THE
COLD WAR PERSECUTION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2004);
CRAIG M. LOFTIN, MASKED VOICES: GAY MEN AND LESBIANS IN COLD WAR AMERICA (2012).
7
See, e.g., K.A. CUORDILEONE, MANHOOD AND POLITICAL CULTURE IN THE COLD WAR 36
(2005); CORBER, supra note 6, at 136; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 159–60 (describing stories of men
who tried to “straighten [themselves] out” to rid themselves of their sexual tendencies).
8
See CANADAY, supra note 5, at 56–58 (discussing the collaboration between immigration and
military officials to identify gay persons).
9
See DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 7 (2012)
(describing the formation of the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis); Comment on
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from race, gay activists framed sexual orientation as inborn and involuntary.10 By
contrast to race, however, activists also described sexual orientation as private and
unrelated to personally-held moral views.11 In this way, in the short term,
homophile activists could tackle discrimination against gays and lesbians without
questioning the legitimacy of moral or religious opposition to homosexuality.
Over time, however, courts and lawmakers developed their own definition of
sexual orientation, and the legal definition advanced by homophile groups had the
unintended consequence of justifying discrimination based on public identity or
conduct rather than status.12
Recognizing the risks associated with sexual orientation as a legal category,
activists in the 1970s developed an alternative approach based on sexual or
affectional preference.13 This category promised to protect those victimized because
of public identity, conduct, stereotyping, or misperception.14 Additionally, by
contrast to some definitions of sexual orientation, sexual preference as a category
explicitly challenged the legitimacy of private, anti-gay bias.15 After the advent of
the AIDS epidemic and the rise of the Religious Right and New Right, lawyers
and activists would once again make sexual orientation the centerpiece of legal and
political strategy.16
The history of sexual orientation exposes the hidden costs of the victory
achieved in Obergefell and the cases likely to follow it. Today, characterizing sexual
identity as voluntary is a foundational element for arguments against the creation of
strong civil rights laws for GLBTQ individuals. But contrary to what contemporary
politics would suggest, the idea of an immutable sexual orientation has been used to
limit equal treatment and justify intolerance on moral grounds.
In particular, examining the history of sexual orientation gives cause for concern
about any definition of sexual orientation, like Obergefell’s, based on immutability.
Arguments from immutability carry familiar disadvantages associated with
reasoning from race. For instance, with respect to sex discrimination, an analogy to
race helped conservative courts turn away equal-protection arguments involving

SEXOLOGY’s Symposium: The Causes of Homosexuality, MATTACHINE REV., July–Aug. 1955, at
32 (discussing the opinions of an expert who believed homosexuality was an orientation “properly and
deeply-implanted” in one’s nature); id. at 33 (“[H]omosexuals should not be considered as persons
affected by a disease.”); Purpose of the Daughters of Bilitis, LADDER, Dec. 1964, at 1, 2. (stating that
one of the purposes of the Daughters of Bilitis was educating “the public at large through acceptance
first of the individual, leading to an eventual breakdown of erroneous taboos and prejudices”).
10
See RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT, supra note 5, at 597–98, 614–15.
11
See infra, notes 99, 101 and accompanying text.
12
See infra Part III.
13
See infra Part II.
14
See infra Part II.
15
See infra Part II.
16
See infra Part II.
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reproduction because of the biological differences between men and women with
respect to gestation.17
Obergefell emphasizes that same-sex couples are similarly situated to oppositesex couples with respect to their ability to parent, carry on committed relationships,
and appreciate the value of marriage as an institution.18 But arguments from
immutability admit the possibility that other “real” differences will undermine an
otherwise promising equal protection claim. In the context of cases involving
parental rights, same-sex couples (although not same-sex individuals) arguably
differ biologically in their ability to reproduce in vivo rather than turning to assisted
reproduction. Laws regulating same-sex adoption, parenting, and access to assisted
reproductive technologies (ART) may be affected by the kind of “real” differences
logic often associated with arguments from immutability.
Arguments from immutability set an additional trap. To make progress under
politically challenging circumstances, gay rights activists emphasized that sexual
orientation was not only immutable but also expressed in private. This strategy
opened the door to penalties based on conduct rather than status. In particular, the
conduct-status distinction has cropped up as courts weigh conscience-based
objections to otherwise applicable civil-rights protections for gays and lesbians.
While these claims have not yet had much success, the history of sexual-orientation
arguments, together with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the subject, offer
reason for concern. 19 The Supreme Court has more often protected conduct-based
discrimination when discriminators invoke what the courts view as a legitimate
moral objection to a behavior.20 Obergefell assumes that moral and religious
objections to same-sex marriage are defensible and even protected.21 As the Court’s
opinion suggests, immutability arguments do not address whether individuals’
choices deserve respect, making it harder to argue against the kind of consciencebased objection now championed by individuals and businesses opposed to samesex marriage.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the emergence of a sexualorientation based strategy to homosexuality, which arose in the 1950s and 1960s.
At the height of the Cold War, politicians transformed psychological arguments
that homosexuality was a mental illness. Reformist therapists pushed back, insisting
that sexual orientation—defined as an unchanging propensity22—could not be
altered by criminal penalties and that sodomy bans were both pointless and

17
See SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
REVOLUTION 63–68, 94–95, 217–18 (2011); see also Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the
Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1792–93, 1796–97 (2008).
18
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601–08 (2015).
19
See infra Part III.
20
Id.
21
See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
22
Homosexuality and Prostitution: B.M.A. Memorandum of Evidence for Departmental
Committee, 2 Brit. Med. J. 165, 165 (Supp. 1955).
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inhumane. Starting in the 1950s, homophile groups defined sexual orientation in a
similar way, but their approach delivered mixed results.23
Part I explains that in the 1950s and 1960s, courts and bureaucrats used the
distinction between status and conduct to limit antidiscrimination protections.
Assuming that sexual orientation, like race, was an immutable status, skeptical
courts often rejected the claims of those who “flaunt[ed]” their sexual orientation.24
Additionally, in early cases involving same-sex marriage, courts drew on the idea of
real, biological differences developed in the context of race and sex. Because gay
and lesbian couples were not similarly situated with respect to reproduction and
biology, courts identified a rational basis for state restrictions on same-sex
marriage.
Part II explores the rise of the concept of sexual preference or choice as an
alternative to sexual orientation. In early cases involving sexual orientation and
privacy, judges used the distinction between orientation and conduct to justify
employment discrimination against persons who publicly identified as gay or
lesbian.25 As an alternative, activists in both national and state organizations
defined a new legal category based on sexual or affectional preference.26 As Part II
shows, enthusiasm for this legal approach waned in the face of the AIDS epidemic
and the Religious Right and the New Right.27 Despite diminishing support for the
concept of sexual preference, the reemergence of the concept of sexual orientation
was neither inevitable nor a logical step in the growing tolerance of homosexuality.
Part III studies the lead up to the Obergefell decision and the legal and political
consequences of the different ideas of orientation following the decision. In
particular, Part III focuses on the unintended costs of immutability arguments. Part
IV briefly concludes.
I. THE INVENTION OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A LEGAL CATEGORY
Prior to the 1950s, the rhetoric of sexual orientation did not refer to a status or
apply disproportionately to homosexuality, but instead described sexually explicit
materials or criticized individuals, gay or straight, who were particularly interested
in sexual intercourse.28
In the early 1950s, however, Cold War politics, new developments in sexology
and psychology, and the emergence of homophile organizations changed the
popular meaning of sexual orientation. Starting in 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy
23

See infra Part I.
See, e.g., Singer v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 530 F.2d 247, 251–54 (9th Cir. 1976);
Acanfora v. Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843, 856–57 (D. Md. 1973).
25
See Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 856–57.
26
See infra notes 264, 269, 286, 289–90 and accompanying text.
27
See infra Part II.
28
For illustrations of this earlier, more general use of sexual orientation, see, for example, Albert
Eide Parr, Sex Dimorphism and Schooling Behavior Among Fishes, 65 AM. NATURALIST 173, 176–80
(1931); David Riesman, Psychological Types and National Character: An Informal Commentary, 5
AM. Q. 325, 325–43 (1953).
24
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(R-WI) and his allies in Congress targeted alleged gays and lesbians in the State
Department.29 The Red Scare brought unprecedented political attention not only
to the presence of homosexuals in the government but also to the definition of
homosexuality.30 McCarthy and his colleagues helped to forge a discourse based on
mental illness, weakness, vulnerability, and political progressivism.31 Because
homosexuals were sick and morally weak, McCarthy argued that they were far
more likely to endorse Communism or fall prey to blackmail schemes.32
The conflation of Communism and homosexuality sparked debate about
whether McCarthy’s vision of gays and lesbians rang true. For some time,
sexologists and psychologists had debated whether people could choose not to be
gay.33 Since the nineteenth century, researchers had discussed whether
homosexuality was immutable, either the result of genetics, hormones, or a
combination of the two.34 The Red Scare transformed this dialogue into a political
and legal battle. In Britain and the United States, with the politicization of debate,
psychologists took fresh interest in the subject of sexuality, publishing new studies
distinguishing sexual behavior from what therapists called sexual orientation.35
While psychologists maintained that gays or lesbians could refrain from
homosexual behavior, the new studies affirmed that sexual orientation—a person’s
ingrained preference or propensity—would not change after therapy.36
This Part traces the development of sexual orientation as a legal category. First,
this Part explores the political debate about the origins and nature of homosexuality
that emerged during the Cold War, as McCarthy and his allies transformed
arguments that same-sex sexuality signaled mental illness. Next, this Part traces the
development of sexual orientation arguments in the homophile movement. Finally,
the Part illuminates how some courts used the idea of sexual orientation to limit
demands for equal treatment made by gays and lesbians.

29

See infra pp. 7–9.
See infra pp. 7–9.
31
See infra pp. 7–9.
32
See infra pp. 7–9.
33
See infra p. 7.
34
For a summary of the state of the pre-1970s debate among psychiatrists and psychologists about
the nature of homosexuality, see Albert Ellis, Constitutional Factors in Homosexuality: A ReExamination of the Evidence, 1 ADVANCES IN SEX RESEARCH 161, 161–79, 182 (1963).
35
See, e.g., Desmond Curran & Denis Parr, Homosexuality: An Analysis of 100 Male Cases Seen
in Private Practice, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 797, 797–801 (1957) (studying a group of patients that had
demonstrated homosexual tendencies to better define the characteristics of homosexuals);
Homosexuality and Prostitution: B.M.A. Memorandum of Evidence for Departmental Committee, 2
Brit. Med. J. 165, 165–70 (Supp. 1955) (discussing the “causes and nature of homosexuality and
prostitution”); Treatment of Homosexuality, 1 BRIT. MED. J. 1347, 1347 (1958) (assessing medical
interventions for treating homosexuality).
36
See Homosexuality and Prostitution: B.M.A. Memorandum of Evidence for Departmental
Committee, supra note 35, at S165–69.
30
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A. Cold War Politics Redefine Homosexuality
The definition of homosexuality had long been a subject of fascination for
psychologists
and
sexologists.
Sexologists
including
Richard
von
Krafft-Ebing (1886),37 and Albert Havelock Ellis (1897)38 argued that
homosexuality was an inborn, genetic condition.39 Others maintained that
homosexuality resulted from a hormonal imbalance.40 Another line of disagreement
touched on whether effective treatment could eliminate homosexuality.41
In 1950, when Senator McCarthy went public with arguments about a
connection between homosexuality and Communism, political interest in the
nature of sexuality intensified considerably.42 In speaking to the media, McCarthy
told a story about a “flagrant homosexual” who had worked at the State
Department and won reinstatement, notwithstanding concern that the employee
would be a security risk.43 McCarthy suggested that closeted homosexuals posed a
particularly pernicious threat to the nation because of the potential for blackmail.44
Given that sodomy was against the law,45 McCarthy insinuated that gays and
lesbians would sacrifice the nation’s security rather than risk public exposure.46
Republicans soon realized that the supposed threat of homosexuality was a
powerful political weapon. With Democrat Harry Truman in the White House,
McCarthy and his allies suggested that neither the administration nor the
Democratic Party could protect the nation.47 If the Democratic Party was unwilling
or unable to keep “sexual perverts” out of important, sensitive national positions,
how could Truman meaningfully fight the Cold War?48
In 1950, Guy George Gabrielson, the chairman of the Republican National
Committee, played up what he called “the homosexual angle,” arguing that the
“sexual perverts who have infiltrated our government” were as “dangerous as the
37
See RICHARD VON KRAFFT-EBING, PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS, WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE
CONTRARY SEXUAL INSTINCT: A MEDICO FORENSIC STUDY (Charles Gilbert Chaddock, trans.,
F.A. Davis Co. 1892) (1886).
38
See HAVELOCK ELLIS & JOHN ADDINGTON SYMONDS, SEXUAL INVERSION (1897).
39
See Ellis, supra note 34, at 161 (summarizing studies of Krafft-Ebing and Albert Havelock Ellis).
40
See id.
41
See id. at 175–80 (offering an overview of scholarly field).
42
On preoccupation with homosexuality during the Cold War, see, for example, D’EMILIO
& FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 294–97; The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold
War America, supra note 6, at 226–32.
43
See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 26–27; William S. White, McCarthy Says Miss Kenyon
Helped 28 Red Front Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1950, at 1; see also CARPENTER, supra note 9, at 6;
BYRNE FONE, HOMOPHOBIA: A HISTORY 390–91 (2000).
44
See RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PERSPECTIVE 167
(1990); JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 24; HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A
HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 244 (2014).
45
CARPENTER, supra note 9, at 1–6.
46
See, e.g., The Homosexual Menace: The Politics of Sexuality in Cold War America, supra note
6, at 227–28, 230.
47
Id. at 227.
48
See id.
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Communists [themselves].”49 A Senate committee investigating the issue in 1950
concluded that thousands of homosexuals worked in the federal government and
put Americans at risk.50
The Senate investigation produced a new analysis on the connection between
homosexuality and Communism. McCarthy and his allies had previously played up
the risk of blackmail.51 Prominent senators argued that gays and lesbians were also
especially likely to be Communists because homosexuality was a profound mental
disturbance.52 Senator Clyde Hoey (D-NC) explained to the New York Times,
“The lack of emotional stability which is found in most sex perverts, and the
weakness of their moral fiber, makes them susceptible to the blandishments of
foreign espionage agents.”53 McCarthy had argued that Communism itself resulted
from mental illness.54 By connecting homosexuality to the Red Scare, some
Senators, especially Republicans, crafted a new image of gays and lesbians as
mentally unbalanced, selfish, and vulnerable to the influence of foreign foes.
This new understanding of homosexuality soon justified a dramatic expansion
of efforts to legally surveil and punish gays and lesbians.55 Shortly after his 1953
inauguration, President Dwight Eisenhower signed into law an executive order
making homosexuality sufficient grounds for dismissal from federal employment.56
New applicants for federal jobs faced a rigorous screening process that kept many
gays and lesbians out of federal jobs.57 Many state and local governments largely
copied the federal approach, as did private industries.58 The Armed Services also
stepped up its efforts to police homosexuality, developing a more elaborate policy
concerning when and why gays and lesbians posed a threat to the morale and
security of the nation’s troops.59
The crackdown on gays and lesbians spawned new legal definitions of
homosexuality. One such definition took shape between 1950 to 1952, when

49

Perverts Called Government Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1950, at 25.
See, e.g., William S. White, Inquiry by Senate on Perverts Asked, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1950, at
8 [hereinafter Inquiry by Senate on Perverts Asked]. The press would regularly report on the total
number of State Department employees dismissed as being “sexual perverts.” See, e.g., 384 Ousters
Listed in State Department, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1953, at 15; 126 Perverts Discharged: State
Department Reports Total Ousted Since Jan. 1, 1951, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1952, at 25.
51
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52
See, e.g., Federal Vigilance on Perverts Asked, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1950, at 3; Inquiry by
Senate on Perverts Asked, supra note 50.
53
Federal Vigilance on Perverts Asked, supra note 52, at 3.
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See JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 16.
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Senator Patrick McCarran (D-NV) spearheaded an overhaul of the nation’s
immigration law.60 McCarran promised a unifying approach to immigration based
on “color-blind” citizenship and shared values.61 While the 1952 McCarran-Walter
Act preserved “the national origins quota system” that favored immigrants from
Northern and Western Europe,62 the law assumed that all Americans citizens
shared an aversion to sexual deviance.63 In addition to carrying forward the policy
of excluding aliens on the basis of “crime of moral turpitude,” the drafters of the act
wanted to exclude persons afflicted with “psychopathic personalities,” or persons
who were “homosexuals or sex pervert[s].”64 After the Public Health Commission
reassured members of Congress that the language of “psychopathic personality” was
broad enough to encompass homosexuality, the final version of the McCarranWalter Act only implicitly addressed sexual behavior. 65
After 1944, the military also developed new tools to identify, discharge, and
discipline homosexual personnel.66 Previously, servicemen and women could face
dishonorable discharge for violent or consensual homosexual acts.67 Starting in the
1950s, the military also investigated and censured service members for “homosexual
‘tendencies,’” a strategy that allowed officers to target those only suspected of being
gay or lesbian.68

B. Homophile Groups Use Scientific Uncertainty as an Argument Against
Discrimination
As Margot Canaday has shown, the law helped to shape the public
understanding of homosexuality, defining it not only as a statutory category but
also as an identity citizens adopted, resisted, and helped to shape.69 However,
starting in the 1950s, medical professionals and homophile activists resisted the
definition of homosexuality emerging in immigration and military law.70 Groups
advocating for the rights of gays and lesbians organized earlier in the decade in

60
See, e.g., CANADAY, supra note 5, at 215–21l; ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN
DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882, at 113–28 (2004); BILL
ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 73–74 (2004).
61
CANADAY, supra note 5, at 216–17.
62
Id. at 217.
63
See id. (noting “non-deviant citizens” were “strengthened by their common opposition” to
homosexuals).
64
See CANADAY, supra note 5, at 218–19. See also, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2012) (prohibiting
admission of aliens who committed a “crime involving moral turpitude”).
65
See S. REP. NO. 1137–82, at 9 (1952); H.R. 2379, 82d Cong. § 212(a) (1951). See also
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See generally CANADAY, supra note 5, at 177–211 (providing overview of the development of
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response to the federal and state repression of homosexuality.71 One of the first
organizations, the Mattachine Society, took inspiration from the publicity
surrounding Alfred Kinsey’s controversial work on sexuality.72 In 1948, Kinsey, a
zoologist at Indiana University, and his colleagues published Sexual Behavior in the
Human Male.73 Kinsey reported that 46% of male subjects had reacted sexually to
persons of the same sex, and nearly 40% had had at least one homosexual
experience.74
Encouraged by the Kinsey Report, Harry Hay, a former Communist and labor
activist, proposed that gay men organize to demand better treatment.75 By
December 1950, Hay led the first meeting of the Mattachine Society in
California.76 Over the course of the next decade, chapters of the Mattachine
Society formed in several major metropolitan areas, and the organization replaced
any connection to Communism with a focus on civil rights.77 In 1952, a group of
Mattachine members formed ONE, Inc., another gay rights group, and three years
later, a lesbian couple, Del Martin and Phyllis Lyons, helped to form the first
lesbian rights organization, the Daughters of Bilitis (DOB).78
Early homophile organizations primarily provided a social outlet for individuals
who could face criminal sanctions for publicly expressing themselves.79 However,
ONE, Mattachine, and DOB soon started working toward an alternative definition
of homosexuality, one that would challenge the anti-gay assumptions increasingly
being written into law.80 From the start, homophile publications experimented with
71
On the rise of the homophile movement, see, for example, FADERMAN, supra note 5, at 53–90;
RETHINKING THE GAY AND LESBIAN MOVEMENT, supra note 5, at 42–74; SEXUAL POLITICS,
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72
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74
Id. at 84.
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supra note 5, at 62–77, 74–84 (discussing the evolution of the Mattachine Society and its break from the
Communist views of its founders).
78
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39–69; C. TODD WHITE, PRE-GAY L.A.: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT FOR
HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS 39–43, 89–113 (2009).
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other advice on homosexuality to their followers); SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES, supra
note 5, at 108–13, 203–04 (discussing each homophile organization’s publications and their efforts to
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See, e.g., FADERMAN, supra note 5, at 63–66 (discussing Mattachine’s efforts to support a
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alternative definitions of homosexuality. In 1955, for example, the Mattachine
Review published a piece asking, “Why not regard homosexuality as merely a
difference in the direction of the sexual instinct?”81 In the mid-1950s, DOB’s
magazine, The Ladder, proposed a similar understanding of lesbianism.82 DOB
Leader, Del Martin, argued, “The Lesbian is a woman endowed with all the
attributes of any other woman,” the “only difference lies in her choice of a love
partner.”83
In the mid-1950s, led by ONE, homophile groups publicized research on the
causes and treatment of homosexuality.84 Given the scientific uncertainty
surrounding homosexuality, ONE and its allies argued that lawmakers should not
seek to define a term even the experts failed to understand.85 “Because we will
grapple with such controversial question as: causes, cure[s], social adjustments,
personal behavior, ethical standards, [and] prejudices,” ONE explained, “it is not to
be expected that pat and immediate answers will be easily achieved, if at all.”86
The Mattachine Society similarly relied on this tactic to push back against the
persecution of gay men. Consider the strategy Mattachine used in responding to a
scandal in Boise, Idaho. In the mid-1950s, a private investigator hired to look into
gay sex in the town claimed to have exposed a “homosexual underground”
operating in the city.87 The Boise investigation led to over 1400 interviews and a
handful of arrests, convictions, and sentences of life imprisonment.88
To defuse intense public anger, the leaders of the Mattachine Society argued
that scientific experts, not lawmakers, should define homosexuality.89 Without
understanding homosexuality, lawmakers could not hope to effectively regulate it.90
dissolute”); LOFTIN, supra note 6, at 7–21 (discussing how ONE “nudg[ed] gay people in a more liberal
direction” in the midst of McCarthyism’s efforts to “crack[] down on homosexuals” and “reinforce
conventional sexual morality”); see also infra pp. 9–12 (discussing the influence of the Red Scare on
employment, military, and immigration laws and policies).
81
Luther Allen, Homosexuality: Is It a Handicap or a Talent?, MATTACHINE REV.
July–Aug. 1955, at 4, 8.
82
See Del Martin, The Positive Approach, LADDER, Nov. 1956, at 8, 8.
83
Id.
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On the emphasis put on research, see, for example, GALLO, supra note 79, at 104; HENRY L.
MINTON, DEPARTING FROM DEVIANCE: A HISTORY OF HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS AND
EMANCIPATORY SCIENCE IN AMERICA 55–57, 93–95, 205–36 (2002); MARC STEIN, SEXUAL
INJUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM GRISWOLD TO ROE 139–40 (2010) [hereinafter
SEXUAL INJUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM GRISWOLD TO ROE].
85
See Ken Burns, Homosexuaity in Boise—Let’s Get at the Causes!, MATTACHINE REV., Feb.
1956, at 2, 2, 30 (urging lawmakers and community leaders to objectively consider homosexuality and
“treat the causes” rather than the “symptoms”); One Institute: A SPECIALIZED SCHOOL,
LADDER, June 1957, at 9, 9–12 (discussing ONE’s mission to critically examine and understand the
definition of homosexuality).
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One Institute: A SPECIALIZED SCHOOL, supra note 85, at 13.
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D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 294; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 97–98; SEXUAL
POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES, supra note 5, at 51.
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D’EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 294; JOHNSON, supra note 6, at 97–98; SEXUAL
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Writing on the Boise scandal, Ken Burns, a Mattachine leader, argued, “We have
to get at the root of this social problem before we can solve it judiciously . . . .”91
Later in the decade, the Mattachine Society argued that lawmakers should not
criminalize homosexual sex until scientists could understand or treat it. For
example, Burns explained in 1956, “The solution of the problems of persons yet to
be born who will become homosexual—who are maybe even destined to be
homosexual—lies in preventative means.”92 Scientific uncertainty became a key
argument against the criminalization of sexual conduct. Burns suggested that
punishing gays and lesbians was fruitless until scientists knew what defined
homosexuality.93 Burns explained, “The Mattachine Society is prepared to sit down
with legislators, law enforcement officers, judges and others in the legal field to
work out an objective program to meet the legal problems affecting homosexuality
and to constructively administer to the causes and not the symptoms of the
problem.94
As importantly, a focus on research lent credibility to homophile groups whose
very existence many questioned. In 1956, to advance this effort, ONE created the
ONE Institute, an entity committed to research on homosexuality.95 In the mid-tolate 1950s, participants at the institute entertained a variety of opinions about the
causes of homosexuality.96 While the appearance of objectivity was vital, research
had a clear political aim. As one institute attendee explained, “[W]e must show the
public that homosexuality is not a contagious disease or a great threat to the body
politic as it is so often feared or purported to be . . . .”97

C. Sexual Orientation Becomes Part of an Argument for Equal Treatment
Starting in the late 1950s, DOB and Mattachine began promoting their own
definitions of sexual orientation.98 At the time, homophile groups celebrated the
recommendation by blue ribbon commissions in the United States and Britain that
homosexuality should be decriminalized.99 In 1962, the American Law Institute
(ALI) recommended that private acts of sodomy no longer be governed by criminal
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symposium sponsored by the Daughters of Bilitis).
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law.100 But a different rhetoric of sexual orientation first emerged from a related
dialogue about law reform in 1954 in the United Kingdom, when a governmentsponsored committee of fifteen, known as the Wolfenden Committee, considered
whether prostitution and homosexuality should still be criminalized.101 The
committee asked the British Medical Association (BMA) to provide an evidence
report on the science of homosexuality.102 In 1955, the BMA reported,
“Homosexuality is popularly understood to mean the commission of homosexual
practices. This is not so . . . . Most people, if not all, possess in different degrees
both homosexual and heterosexual potentialities.”103
The BMA used the term “sexual orientation” to describe the limits of
treatment.104 To be sure, the BMA endorsed any effective measure to reduce the
prevalence of homosexuality.105 “The real safeguard against homosexual activity is
public opinion,” the BMA reasoned, “and measures to promote a healthy attitude
toward[] sex should be promoted and supported by all possible means.”106
Nevertheless, the BMA asserted that sexual orientation—an individual’s inborn
propensity—could not be changed.107 “[The medical profession] is in a position to
do valuable work in enabling the individual to overcome his disability, even if it
cannot alter his sexual orientation,” the BMA explained.108 Before and after the
committee issued its final report, the BMA frequently used sexual orientation as
shorthand to distinguish an individual’s conduct from her identity or feelings of
attraction.109
After the release of the Wolfenden Report in 1957, homophile groups
immediately identified the use of the term sexual orientation as a promising
rhetorical strategy.110 The BMA had legitimized arguments that sexual orientation,
however defined, did not change as a result of treatment. This finding fit well with
100
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the conclusion, often stressed at homophile gatherings, that law enforcement could
not legitimately target someone for being gay or lesbian because that person could
not be blamed for her own sexual attractions.111 Confirming that gays and lesbians
should not be punished for something they could not control, sympathetic
attorneys reminded homophile activists that the law criminalized sodomy, not
homosexual status.112
Splitting off conduct from status helped gays and lesbians win limited support
from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). In the 1950s, the ACLU
refused to take a stand against regulations of consensual sex.113 Instead, the group
insisted that homosexuals were unfairly denied due process and disproportionately
punished for violating sodomy laws that applied to everyone else.114 Targeting
unequal treatment allowed both the ACLU and homophile groups to expand legal
protections without challenging the legitimacy of morals regulations. At the same
time, homophile groups distinguished public conduct, including solicitation and
indecency, from private behavior that should not offend anyone.115 This move
proved especially valuable to activists trying to distance themselves from the
negative stereotypes surrounding “flagrant” homosexuality.116
The idea of an unchangeable orientation seemed to be a potent argument
against the selective application of the law to gays and lesbians. In the late 1950s,
for example, DOB emphasized the idea of an unchangeable status in lobbying for
the repeal of California’s criminal vagrancy statute.117 First introduced in the
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nineteenth century, the law often applied to those suspected of having a propensity
to commit victimless sex crimes, including prostitutes and gay men.118 In arguing
against the law, DOB borrowed from and refined the idea of sexual orientation
that had come to the fore during debate about the Wolfenden Report:
Experts in the field [generally concede] that the cause of homosexuality is still an
unknown quantity, that it is a process of development and not a matter of choice,
that the incidence cannot be controlled by legislation, that the fear and insecurity
imposed upon the homosexual by prejudiced and outmoded laws hamper the
therapist in his efforts to help the individual make his adjustment to himself and
society, and finally that [the laws] benefit no one but the blackmailers.119

For DOB, the language of sexual orientation reinforced that criminal laws
could never do any good. Even if legislators viewed homosexuality as harmful, no
criminal law or therapy could change a status that was “not a matter of choice.”120
Nor, if status was immutable, could legislation meaningfully reduce the frequency
of sodomy. Without challenging the legitimacy of morals laws, DOB argued that
they were too ineffective to support.121
An intersecting debate about pornography, censorship, and obscenity reinforced
interest in arguments involving sexual orientation.122 Since the introduction of the
Comstock Act in 1873, federal law had prohibited the mailing of “obscene”
materials, created a new federal position to monitor the mail, and treated violations
as a felony.123 After World War II, the spread of pornography brought on new
concern about the effect of sexually explicit material.124 Soldiers’ consumption of
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pornography worried legislators, as did the spread of comic books.125 In 1955,
psychiatrist Frederic Wertham published Seduction of the Innocent, indicting
comic books for corrupting the sexual morals of the nation’s youth.126 Wertham
expressed particular concern about the possibility that “normal” children exposed to
comics would become homosexual, and he maintained that Batman, the popular
superhero, was “psychologically homosexual.”127
Fears about the effect of pornography soon gave rise to political action. In 1954,
parent-teacher associations in several states, demanded laws outlawing sex,
violence, and crime in the comic books read by teenagers.128 The same year, a
congressional subcommittee on juvenile delinquency led by Senator Estes Kefauver
(D-TN) pursued the theory that pornographic materials changed the sexual
behavior of American youth.129 As one of Kefauver’s allies in Congress testified,
pornography had been tied to “related problems such as juvenile delinquency, the
rise in crime rate, teenage discontent and rebellion, and even certain trends in the
field of mental illness.”130 The same year, the solicitor for the Postmaster General
argued that sexually explicit materials would convert “juveniles, and persons who
have not the intelligence, nor the background, to withstand it.” 131
Homophile groups used the idea of sexual orientation to defuse the danger of
censorship of their own publications. In 1957, when the Los Angeles Postmaster
refused to mail a copy of ONE Magazine, GLBTQ movement attorneys argued
that it was not obscene under the Comstock Act or related federal regulations.132 In
an extremely brief per curium opinion, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court
decision holding ONE to be obscene,133 but for movement members, the issue of
pornography reached beyond the issue of censorship. Central to the Kefauver
125
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126
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hearings was an assumption that sexual identity changed if an individual was
exposed to the wrong magazine.134
Groups like the Mattachine Society seized on the idea of sexual orientation to
explain that tolerance of gays and lesbians would not increase the odds that other
Americans, particularly juveniles, would become homosexual. As Curtis Dewees
explained in the Mattachine Review in 1958, “Most of my readers will realize that .
. . one’s personality orientation is not changed by the mere reading of books.”135 A
year later, William Reynard, of the ACLU, criticized legislators for refusing to
recognize their “inability to change the orientation of [homosexuals].”136

D. The Mattachine Society of Washington Promotes Sexual Orientation as a
Legal Category
The rhetoric of sexual orientation took on new importance after 1961, when
Frank Kameny, a former astronomer dismissed from his federal position, founded a
more militant chapter of Mattachine in Washington, DC.137 While earlier leaders
and other Mattachine chapters had mostly used scientific uncertainty as an
argument against the aggressive persecution of gays, Kameny’s Mattachine Society
of Washington (MSW) publicized a legal definition of sexual orientation designed
to help gays and lesbians take on the federal government. “Our movement, whether
we like it to be so or not, is primarily one of a political, public-relations, and socialaction nature, and only to a limited degree, a scientific one,” Kameny explained.138
“For these reasons of fact, of logic, and of strategy and tactics, I, personally, take
the position that . . . homosexuality, per se, is neither a sickness, a defect, a
disturbance, nor a malfunction of any sort.”139
MSW leaders argued that gays and lesbians, not psychologists or bureaucrats,
had the most expertise about homosexuality.140 Even so, MSW leaders defined
134
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sexual orientation primarily as a legal alternative to the definitions emerging in
medicine, politics, and immigration and employment law.141 MSW explained its
agenda in the following terms:
The Society maintains that, in the absence of valid evidence to the
contrary, homosexuality is not a sickness, but is an orientation not
different in kind from heterosexuality. It aims primarily to combat
prejudice and discrimination by seeking acceptance of the homosexual as
a homosexual, not by “rehabilitating” him or converting him to
heterosexuality.142

In MSW’s analysis, the idea of sexual orientation served as an alternative to
both of the major legal attacks on homosexuality. First, by describing
homosexuality as an orientation, MSW rejected its categorization as a mental
illness, instead defining homosexuality and heterosexuality as equally natural,
healthy, and normal. Second, by rejecting the idea that homosexuality was a matter
of changeable behavior or preference, MSW built a more compelling case for
ending anti-gay discrimination and dispelled rumors that openly gay men could
convert others to homosexuality. The rhetoric of sexual orientation signaled that
homosexuality was both immutable and largely unrelated to an individual’s
adjustment or societal contributions.
The idea of sexual orientation also figured centrally in what one homophile
magazine called “the need for salesmanship.”143 In the early 1960s, sympathetic
media outlets provided more coverage of issues related to homosexuality.144 To
benefit from this new media attention, groups like DOB and Mattachine hoped to
develop a message that would resonate with those who did not yet hold a strong
opinion about homosexuality. One strategy that emerged from Mattachine’s
national convention in the early 1960s urged activists to emphasize the following
issues:
That the homosexual . . . is willing to look upon society with good
will . . . that there are many types of homosexuals and many different
Lesbians and Gays and the Politics of Knowledge: Rethinking General Models of Mass Opinion
Change, in SEXUAL IDENTITIES, QUEER POLITICS 348 (Mark Blasius ed., 2001) (detailing Frank
Kameny’s insistence that gay activists had more authority to “speak on the question of homosexuality”
than scientific experts).
141
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attitudes about them; that homosexuality is not a remote contagious
disease, but a combination of hereditary and environmental
conditions.145

Significantly, Kameny and MSW made sexual orientation an important part of
an analogy MSW drew between race and sexuality.146 Homophile activists began
reasoning from race almost from the outset. In 1955, the Mattachine Review
highlighted research suggesting “that homosexuality is caused by a physiological
predisposition”; “If this is so,” the Mattachine Review argued, “a homosexual is no
more responsible for his [homosexuality] than are people responsible for the color
of their skins”.147
By the early 1960s, when the civil rights movement was consistently making
headlines, the benefits of reasoning from race seemed clear. As The Ladder
explained in 1963, “The U.S. is being compelled to listen to and grant rights to all
minority groups.”148 DOB made the case that gays and lesbians counted as a
minority, both politically and constitutionally, stating: “[A] minority is a group
who are considered . . . to have a trait in common.”149 The DOB further explained
that, “[T]he individual himself is blamed and punished for attributes that rightly or
wrongly are placed on the entire group, and the group as a whole is blamed or
punished for the transgressions of individuals.”150 Ultimately, in DOB’s analysis,
the threat of stereotyping faced both racial and sexual minorities.
MSW elaborated on DOB’s experimentation with analogies between
homosexuality and race. In a 1962 letter to Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
Kameny explained, “We feel that for the 15,000,000 American homosexuals, we
are in much the same position as the NAACP is in for the Negro, except for the
minor difference that . . . we are fighting official prejudice and discriminatory
policy and practice . . . at the [f]ederal level.”151 In support of this argument,
Kameny defined the homosexual as “one whose direction of choice of a sexual
partner differs from that of the majority of the citizenry in what he is attracted to
and chooses partners of his or her own sex.”152 While gays and lesbians may have
control over their conduct or partners, Kameny clarified that no one had control
over his orientation. He stated, “Homosexuality is neither a . . . disease . . . nor
145
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other disturbance, but merely a matter of the predisposition of a significantly large
minority of our citizens.”153
Later in the 1960s, as MSW became increasingly prominent, the organization
continued emphasizing arguments involving sexual orientation. Writing under the
pseudonym Warren Adkins, MSW leader, Jack Nichols,154 maintained that
“homosexuality per se is not a sickness, but is an orientation not different in kind
from heterosexuality.”155 Nichols reminded readers of the importance of convincing
Americans that homosexuality was nothing more than a sexual orientation:
“[S]ickness equals inferior status . . . . It is on the issure [sic] of homosexuality as a
sickness that the homophile movement will . . . fight its most crucial and repeated
battles.”156 At a gathering with religious leaders, Kameny reiterated that
homosexuality “per se is neither a sickness, disturbance, or other pathology, but is
rather . . . [an] orientation . . . fully on par with, and not different in kind from,
heterosexuality.”157
Over the course of the 1960s, MSW, DOB, and their allies worked to rebrand
their cause as a fight to to outlaw sexual orientation discrimination and informed
the media that the homosexual movement was open to members of any sexual
orientation.158 In 1964, DOB attacked public health authorities in New York for
continuing to label homosexuality as a disease.159 Leaders of the group contended,
how . . . we conduct our sex life is an important moral problem for all of us,
whether we are heterosexual or homosexual.”160 In 1962, with expanding interest in
gay rights, DOB, MSW, and other organizations formed the East Coast
Homophile Organization (ECHO), a loose umbrella group that would coordinate
the work of homophile groups.161 The message that emerged from ECHO
conferences centered on orientation.162 In 1968, when a variety of homophile
groups adopted a bill of rights for gays and lesbians, Rev. Robert Warren Cromey
explained, “To subject [homosexuals] to legal harassment and exclude them from
153
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employment solely because of their sexual orientation is a violation of their
constitutional rights.”163
Arguments involving sexual orientation offered several important strategic
advantages. First, as Kameny tried to compare his movement to the quest for civil
rights, the rhetoric of sexual orientation bolstered MSW’s reasoning from race. As
MSW defined it, sexual orientation, like race, was immutable but largely unrelated
to individual character, personality, or adjustment.164 Moreover, in the same way
that all Americans had a race, MSW argued that every American had a sexual
orientation, none superior to or more natural than any other.165 Reasoning from
race allowed MSW to combat key justifications for anti-gay discrimination. If
homosexuality could be cured, gays and lesbians could logically respond to
discrimination by changing their behavior. And if homosexuality was pathological,
then gays and lesbians were not similarly situated to their heterosexual counterparts
and could not logically demand equal treatment.
Just as important, the idea of sexual orientation allowed MSW to argue that the
case against sexual orientation discrimination was even stronger than the one
against racial bias. Whereas race was visible, MSW leaders argued in the context of
federal employment that sexual orientation was private, unrelated to workplace
conduct, and therefore made no difference to the co-workers or employers of gays
and lesbians.166 MSW leaders testified before the United States Civil Service
Commission that “[p]rivate, consensual sexual acts . . . [between] adults . . . [a]re
not, under any circumstances, the proper concern of an employer, public or
private.”167 Not only was sexual orientation immutable and unrelated to character;
Mattachine leaders also framed sexual orientation as a harmless difference to which
no reasonable employer could logically object.
By the late 1960s, homophile attorneys and their allies in organizations like the
ACLU used the idea of sexual orientation to challenge discriminatory immigration
and employment laws.168 Litigation had unintended consequences, however, as the
courts used a different idea of sexual orientation to uphold discriminatory practices
and policies.
In the immigration context, movement members initially stayed away from the
idea of an immutable sexual orientation. Even so, the Supreme Court used the idea
of sexual orientation to forge what Kenji Yoshino has called a “one drop rule”—a
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conclusion that any same-sex sexual act signals homosexuality.169 Borrowing from
the idea that homosexuality was a matter of inborn, immutable preference, the
courts expanded federal authority to deport anyone proven to have had homosexual
sex.170
Later, after the movement popularized the idea of homosexuality as an
immutable sexual orientation, courts used the distinction between conduct and
status to limit antidiscrimination protections. By distinguishing orientation from
conduct and identity, certain judges and administrative officials sustained
discrimination against employees who “flaunted” their status.171 Immutability
became a limiting principle for demands for protection against discrimination.172
By the 1970s, when activists first challenged bans on same-sex marriage, the
courts turned immutability arguments against the movement in a different way.
Movement members analogized sexual orientation to race and sex, arguing that all
three were immutable.173 Drawing on this logic, courts sometimes concluded that
same-sex couples were not similarly situated to heterosexual couples with respect to
either marriage or reproduction.174 The idea of real, biological differences that the
Supreme Court used to sever the connection between sex equality and reproduction
stood at the heart of decisions limiting access to marriage.

E. In Boutilier, Activists Separate Status and Conduct
In the context of immigration, movement members temporarily moved away
from framing sexual orientation as an immutable orientation in
Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, a case that found its way to
the Supreme Court.175 Clive Michael Boutilier, a Canadian immigrant, had moved
to the United States to pursue better employment opportunities.176 In 1963, he
applied for citizenship, and during his interview, he admitted that he had been
arrested on a sodomy charge.177 After further questioning, Boutilier acknowledged
that he had previously engaged in both homosexual and heterosexual acts.178
Indeed, at the time he sought naturalization, Boutilier was in a long-term,
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committed relationship with another man.179 On the basis of these admissions,
immigration officials submitted Boutilier’s case to the Public Health Service, which
certified that Boutilier was “afflicted with . . . a psychopathic personality” under the
McCarren-Walter Act and therefore subject to deportation.180
When Boutilier appealed, his case won the support of the ACLU and a
homophile group, the Homosexual Law Reform Society, a group headed by Clark
Polak, a veteran activist and the head of the Janus Society,181 a prominent
homophile organization.182 As Marc Stein has written, both organizations made
the decision not to describe Boutilier as openly gay, instead emphasizing that he
had been sexually involved with both men and women.183 To be sure, as Stein
argues, this tactical conservatism contributed to Boutilier’s struggles in court,
especially when the justices noted that Boutilier himself had at times described his
orientation as a status.184 However, in Boutilier, the idea of an immutable sexual
orientation, so successfully championed by homophile activists, served as a core
reason for his deportation.
Boutilier raised a number of procedural arguments.185 Primarily, though,
Boutilier argued that the McCarren-Walter Act did not apply to homosexuals or
give adequate notice that his conduct would subject him to deportation.186 This
argument failed in the Second Circuit, but the Supreme Court soon granted
certiorari to resolve a circuit split.187 In the Ninth Circuit, in Fleuti v. Rosenburg,
the court had accepted the “void for vagueness” argument and reaffirmed that
argument in 1966.188
At the Supreme Court, both Boutilier’s counsel and the Homosexual Law
Reform Association transformed the definition of homosexuality developed by
homophile organizations. While Boutilier’s counsel echoed arguments that
homosexuality was not a mental illness,189 because Boutilier could plausibly claim to
have a more fluid sexual identity, his attorney described homosexuality, at least in
179
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his case, as a matter of conduct, not orientation.190 “By and large,” Boutilier
explained, “homosexuality is a kind of behavior, evidently very wide-spread, and
not the manifestation of a particular kind of person.”191
Recognizing that the category of psychopathic personality under the
McCarren-Walter Act most clearly covered a condition, Boutilier disconnected
sexual orientation and sexual conduct.192 In the political arena, groups like MSW
played up the connection between behavior and status, describing sexual
orientation as an immutable, naturally occurring trait.193 At least for those like
Boutilier, his attorney insisted that sexual relationships were voluntarily chosen and
distinguishable from any more lasting identity.194 “[T]here is nothing in the record
to establish or even suggest that those experiences were compulsive in character and
not merely a matter of choice,” Boutilier argued.195 The distinction between freely
chosen conduct and immutable identity meant both that Boutilier did not count as
a psychopathic personality under the statute and did not have notice that
immigration authorities would regard him as such.196
Polak’s Homosexual Law Reform Society of America similarly refined the idea
of sexual orientation on which MSW had frequently relied. The organization’s
brief reasoned, “That homosexuality and heterosexuality represent anything other
than ‘differences among human beings in their sources of pleasure’ has not been
established.”197 The brief canvassed psychological evidence indicating that
homosexuality was not a mental illness, but stopped short of offering the definition
of sexual orientation promoted by MSW.198
Quoting psychiatrists who testified on behalf of the Petitioner, attorneys for the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) responded that homosexuality was
an immutable orientation.199 Pointing to the legislative history of the McCarrenWalter Act, the INS argued that Congress had always intended to treat
homosexuals as being afflicted with a psychopathic personality.200 When discussing
whether the statute excluded Boutilier, the INS used the idea of orientation in
Boutilier’s case to suggest that virtually any homosexual conduct was irrefutable
evidence of status:
This evidence, coupled with the Public Health Service's certificate based
upon it, compelled a finding that petitioner was homosexual when he
entered. It is true that petitioner, by his own account, had had occasional
190
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heterosexual experiences prior to his entry. But they were far fewer than
his homosexual experiences, and hardly detract from his clearly—and
concededly—dominant homosexual orientation.201

Superficially, the INS’s argument read as an assertion that homosexuality was a
mathematical question, and Boutilier had too many same-sex relationships to
qualify as a heterosexual.202 Read more carefully, however, the INS’s argument
leveraged the idea of an immutable orientation that homophile groups had
crafted.203 In this analysis, it no longer mattered whether or not psychiatrists treated
homosexuality as a mental illness.204 Whatever homosexuality was, it was
unchangeable, and sexual behavior signaled a more fixed identity or condition.205 It
was this status, the INS argued, that Congress had targeted in the McCarrenWalter Act.206
The INS also turned the testimony of Boutilier’s expert witnesses on its head.207
Boutilier had presented the opinions of two psychiatric experts, both of whom
emphasized Boutilier’s experimentation with heterosexual sex and his “fluid” sexual
identity.208 The witnesses also asserted that homosexuality was not a mental
illness.209 Even accepting this proposition as true, the INS argued that Boutilier’s
immutable status made him excludable.210 The INS brief emphasized that
Boutilier’s expert had “referred to his ‘homosexual orientation.’”211
This admission, for the INS, was tantamount to acknowledging that Boutilier
was targeted because of who and what he was, not because he had made particular
choices.212 At most, by referring to orientation, Boutilier’s expert could “show that
petitioner, while homosexual, was not dangerous or psychopathic.”213 Because
Boutilier knew he was homosexual, the INS argued that he was clearly excludable
under the act and had ample notice of the possibility that he would be deported.214
The Court’s opinion in Boutilier similarly applied the lens of an immutable
orientation to Boutilier’s case. Writing for a majority of six, Justice Clark first
emphasized that Boutilier admitted to acts that necessarily confirmed his status as a
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homosexual.215 The basis for his deportation, in the majority’s view, lay not with
Boutilier’s post-entry sexual conduct but in the status he had claimed for himself.216
The Court rejected Boutilier’s void-for-vagueness claim on similar grounds.217
Boutilier had argued that he had no notice that post-entry conduct, such as the
sexual contact and an ongoing relationship to which he had admitted, could give
rise to a deportation order.218 The Supreme Court responded that Boutilier was
being deported because of his condition, not his conduct:219 “The petitioner is not
being deported for conduct engaged in after his entry into the United States, but
rather for characteristics he possessed at the time of his entry,” Clark wrote.220
“Here, when petitioner first presented himself at our border for entrance, he was
already afflicted with homosexuality.”221
Boutilier did not squarely address whether a majority of psychiatrists would
view homosexuality as a mental illness.222 Indeed, the Court treated the category of
“psychopathic personality” as a legal question, rather than a scientific one.223
Nevertheless, the Court assumed that homosexuality was a condition, an
unchangeable characteristic.224 Even if there was no psychiatric consensus about
homosexuality, the Boutilier Court reasoned that sexual orientation was an
immutable trait that Congress could legitimately make grounds for deportation.225

F. Courts Treat the Distinction Between Status and Conduct as a Rational Basis
for Discrimination
In the context of employment discrimination, in the 1960s and 1970s, workers
seeking a job in the federal civil service or in public school teaching began
questioning the legitimacy of sexual-orientation discrimination. Bureaucrats and
courts skeptical of these claims argued that while employers could not target
anyone on the basis of an immutable status, the “flaunting” of orientation was fair
game.
The conduct-status distinction first frustrated the movement in its effort to
eliminate discrimination in the civil service. John Macy, the head of the United
States Civil Service Commission in the 1960s, was a committed liberal who had
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spoken favorably of antidiscrimination mandates.226 When Frank Kameny
requested a meeting with Macy, however, Macy turned him down flat.227 Macy
continued refusing similar requests until 1965, when Kameny and a group of
twenty-five activists picketed the United States Civil Service Commission.228
Following the picket, Kameny and a small group of colleagues received a meeting
with some of Macy’s colleagues and were later instructed to submit a written
statement of their views.229 In the written statement, Kameny and Mattachine
elaborated on the claim that sexual orientation was an immutable trait that
subjected gays and lesbians to unjustifiable discrimination.230 The Mattachine
statement asserted that gays and lesbians possessed every relevant trait of a
sociological minority.231 In addition to sharing a common trait and facing
discrimination, gays and lesbians were rarely judged on individual merit. “Minority
group members are judged not as individuals,” the statement explained, “but as
members of a group, every member bearing the consequences and stigma of the
faults, the weaknesses, and the sins of particular individuals.”232 The statement also
reiterated that homosexuality was neither changeable nor pathological.233 As the
statement reasoned, “[w]e do not grant, conceptually, that rehabilitation applies to
homosexuality and its practice.”234
Macy’s response borrowed from the idea of sexual orientation to limit any
demand for protection against discrimination.235 In rejecting Mattachine’s position,
Macy agreed that discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation would be
wrong.236 Rather than targeting anyone on the basis of status, Macy argued that the
Civil Service Commission acted upon the basis of “overt conduct . . . not upon
spurious classification of individuals.”237 By acting on the basis of conduct alone,
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Macy claimed a right to terminate anyone who admitted to being homosexual or
expressed pride in her identity.238 Macy explained:
To be sure[,] if an individual applicant were to publicly proclaim that he
engages in homosexual conduct, that he prefers such relationships, that
he is not sick, or emotionally disturbed, and that he simply has different
sexual preferences, as some members of the Mattachine Society openly
avow, the Commission would be required to find such an individual
unsuitable for Federal employment.239

In early employment discrimination cases, skeptical courts used the distinction
between conduct and a private status, sexual orientation, to reject demands for
equal treatment. Consider the case of Joseph Acanfora, a Maryland school
teacher.240 As a college student at Penn State, he became involved in a homophile
group that sought official recognition from the university.241 When the university
refused, the group brought suit, and Acanfora agreed to be one of the named
plaintiffs.242 While the litigation was pending, Acanfora began pursuing a career in
education and eventually gained a position teaching in the Maryland schools.243
When the Acanfora case again reached the courts, Joseph spoke to the media.244
The school district almost immediately transferred Acanfora to a non-teaching
position.245 Because of his access to the media, Acanfora criticized the school’s
stance on television and in print, and the school ultimately dismissed him.246
In federal district court, Acanfora argued that his firing violated the First
Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment.247 Acanfora contended that he had been a victim of sexual
orientation discrimination, notwithstanding the fact that his behavior and
preferences had no bearing on what happened in public.248 In dicta, the district
court acknowledged that the right to privacy might cover Acanfora’s claim,249 but
the court focused on the claim that Acanfora’s transfer violated his right to free
speech under the First Amendment.250 Because Acanfora had taken his case to the
238
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public, the court viewed his comments as the kind of non-speech covered by the
court’s incitement doctrine.251 Acanfora’s gay pride would be “likely to incite or
produce imminent effects deleterious to the educational process.”252 “There exists
then not only a right of privacy, so strongly urged by the plaintiff, but also a duty of
privacy,” the court explained.253
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals viewed sexual orientation in similar terms.
In Singer v. United States Civil Service Commission, a probationary employee,
John Singer, started work as a typist at the Seattle office of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC).254 At work, Singer identified as a gay man.255
He served on the board of directors of the Seattle Gay Alliance and as an act of
protest, had requested a marriage license for himself and his life partner.256 Because
of Singer’s activism, the EEOC terminated him, citing his “immoral and
notoriously disgraceful conduct, [in] openly and publicly flaunting his homosexual
way of life.”257
In court, Singer argued that his firing violated the First Amendment’s free
speech and free association guarantees, and because there was no rational
connection between his sexual orientation and his ability to perform his job, he
argued that his termination violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.258 Because of Singer’s “open and public flaunting [of] his homosexual
way of life,” the Ninth Circuit rejected his First Amendment and Due Process
claims.259 From the standpoint of Due Process, the court identified a rational basis
for the firing.260 Singer was victimized not on the basis of his sexual orientation but
because his “notorious conduct and open flaunting and careless display of
unorthodox sexual conduct in public might be relevant to the efficiency of the
service.”261 Open conduct also doomed Singer’s First Amendment claim. As the
court reasoned, the Commission could have properly concluded that “the interest of
the Government as an employer ‘in promoting the efficiency of the public service’
outweighed the interest of its employee in exercising his First Amendment Rights
through publicly flaunting and broadcasting his homosexual activities.”262
Cases like Acanfora and Singer showed how the idea of sexual orientation could
be used to justify discrimination against employees who openly challenged anti-gay
251
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bias. As a limiting principle, sexual orientation arguments protected employees only
if they remained “in the closet.” By having a public relationship or participating in
advocacy, gays and lesbians, by definition, gave employers a sufficient reason for
discrimination.

G. Courts Seize on “Real” Differences Between Homosexual and Heterosexual
Couples
In the 1960s and 1970s, courts also seized on the idea of sexual orientation to
defeat early demands for same-sex marriage. When Singer and his life partner were
refused a marriage license, Singer brought suit, arguing that the state’s marriage law
violated both the state and federal constitutions.263 In particular, Singer insisted
that prohibiting same-sex marriage constituted impermissible gender and sexualorientation discrimination.264 First, he contended that “to construe state law to
permit a man to marry a woman but at the same time to deny him the right to
marry another man is to construct an unconstitutional classification ‘on account of
sex.’”265 The court rejected this claim on both state and federal constitutional
grounds, leveraging the biological differences between gay and straight
couples.266 “[I]t is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility of the
birth of children by their union,” the court reasoned.267 “Thus the refusal of the
state to authorize same-sex marriage results from such impossibility of reproduction
rather than from an invidious discrimination ‘on account of sex.’”268
Singer responded that the law discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, a
classification that he thought the courts should treat as suspect.269 But, as the court
reasoned, there was no sexual orientation discrimination because gay and lesbian
couples were not similarly situated to their heterosexual counterparts:
[I]t is apparent that the state’s refusal to grant a license allowing the

appellants to marry one another is not based upon appellants’ status as
males, but rather it is based upon the state’s recognition that our society
as a whole views marriage as the appropriate and desirable forum for
procreation and the rearing of children. This is true even though married
couples are not required to become parents and even though some
couples are incapable of becoming parents and even though not all
couples who produce children are married. These, however, are
exceptional situations. The fact remains that marriage exists as a
protected legal institution primarily because of societal values associated
with the propagation of the human race. Further, it is apparent that no
263

Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1188–90 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
Id. at 1189–90.
265
Id. at 1190.
266
See id. at 1195.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id. at 1196.
264

2017–2018

What is Sexual Orientation?

93

same-sex couple offers the possibility of the birth of children by their
union.270

Defending an unchangeable, immutable status opened the door to justifications
based on the supposed reproductive and biological differences between gay and
straight couples. Borrowing from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on sex
discrimination, courts rejected equal protection claims on the basis that gay couples
could not reproduce in vivo and thereby failed to serve the primary aim of marriage.
Even from the standpoint of due process, the court identified reproductive
differences as a rational basis for excluding gays from marriage.
The same idea of real differences informed the reasoning of Baker v. Nelson,
the first case involving same-sex marriage to make it to the Supreme Court.271
When Baker and his life partner were refused a marriage license, Baker argued that
the state marriage law authorized same-sex marriage and violated the Constitution
if interpreted in any other way.272 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected both
Baker’s due process and equal protection arguments, highlighting a real, biological
difference between gay and straight couples.273 “The institution of marriage [is] a
union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of
children within a family,” the Baker Court explained.274 Even recognizing that
some heterosexual couples did not wish to procreate, the court repeated that
marriage and procreation were inextricably linked and did not logically apply to
same-sex couples.275
Over the course of the 1970s, cases like Acanfora, Singer, and Baker convinced
many in the emerging gay liberation movement that strategies based on sexual
orientation were too risky. Given that certain definitions of sexual orientation had
been effectively used to limit the government’s duty to avoid discrimination,
activists began experimenting with an alternative definition based on sexual or
affectional preference.276
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II. SEXUAL PREFERENCE AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the gay rights movement changed
dramatically. In 1969, in New York City, customers at the Stonewall Inn frustrated
by police harassment and shakedowns fought back.277 The riots came at a time
when identity politics and radical social movements often made the front page.278
Following the Stonewall riots, gay-rights activists formed a more radical movement
of their own.279 Founded in New York City, the Gay Liberation Front (GLF)
described its cause as the sexual liberation of all Americans, gay and straight.280
GLF members also tried to win a place in the broader New Left, and the
organization partnered with black power and feminist groups impatient with the
pace of social change.281 By 1969, former GLF members started the Gay Activists
Alliance (GAA) as a splinter group that would prioritize antidiscrimination
protections for gays and lesbians over a broad New Left agenda.282
GAA focused on a civil-rights ordinance that would outlaw discrimination
against gays and lesbians.283 Members of the GAA rejected the sometimes cautious
approach taken by other gay-rights organizations, handing out pamphlets urging
voters to “vote gay” and holding confrontational “zaps” at public events and the
workplaces of politicians.284 As Jim Owles of GAA explained, “We do not ask for
respectability or sympathy from straight people.”285 GAA leaders framed the bill as
part of an effort to bring gays and lesbians out of the closet. As GAA leader Bruce

277
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Voeller stated, “It should be obvious that our general purpose in getting bills passed
is to educate gays and the general public.”286
While rejecting the strategy adopted by organizations like MSW, GAA initially
used the language of sexual orientation in the bill it promoted.287 Reports stated
that, “The bill is technically an amendment to the city’s Omnibus Human Rights
Act, seeking to insert the words ‘sexual orientation’ among a list of actions on
which discrimination is illegal.”288
The bill’s early struggles highlighted some of the problems with a
sexual-orientation framing encountered by homophile activists in the 1960s. In
January 1972, the bill died in committee.289 GAA leaders blamed the defeat on
New York Mayor, Richard Lindsey, who activists believed had done too little to
support the provision.290 Opposing politicians attributed the bill’s downfall to its
sponsors’ focus on gay pride.291 While ambivalent politicians might support a bill
outlawing discrimination based on purely private sexual orientation, one opponent
of the bill explained that undecided council members “found [activists’ public]
behavior generally repugnant.”292 In February, Lindsey issued a directive banning
discrimination in the city’s department of personnel and civil service commission
on the basis of “private sexual orientation.”293 Lindsey’s move appeared to be a
direct response to the complaints raised by the city council.294 The concept of sexual
orientation seemed to be a limiting principle on the drive for protection against
discrimination, doing nothing to check bias supposedly based on conduct rather
than status.
The use of sexual orientation as a limiting principle continued in 1973. Two
committees of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York endorsed Intro
475 because it focused on private propensity.295 “Much of the resistance to
legislation . . . stems from the belief that all homosexuals behave in a stereotype
fashion[,] which is often identified with eccentric dress and conduct,” the
committees’ report explained.296 “[L]egislation prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation would not require an employer to hire or a landlord to rent to an
individual who was unacceptable for reasons other than sexual orientation.”297 In
286
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December 1973, the same problem cropped up.298 When Intro 475 died again in
committee, its defeat was linked to an amendment that would have exempted
“public transvestites” from the bill.299 When council members rejected the
amendment, its supporters successfully moved for the entire bill to be set aside.300
Indeed, in 1974, when the bill finally made it out of committee, debate turned
on whether it would legitimize public gay conduct. Opponents of the bill, including
the Roman Catholic Church and police and firemen’s unions, contended that it
would give “public license to uninhibited manifestations of sexual preference or
sexual relationships” and would “propagandize deviant forms of sexuality.”301
Council members in favor of the bill successfully added an amendment stating that
“nothing in the definition of sexual orientation . . . ‘shall be construed to bear upon
the standards of attire or dress code.’”302 Even the New York Times endorsed the
bill because of its narrow protections, demanding only “rights [for] a minority who
in their private lives adopt a ‘sexual orientation’ different from the majority.”303
When the bill went down in defeat, the shortcomings of the use of the term sexual
orientation—at least as council members had framed it—seemed clear.304

A. Sexual Preference Emerges as an Alternative Framework
As early as 1973, activists began exploring alternative definitions to sexual
orientation, and one particularly influential effort unfolded in Minneapolis-St.
Paul.305 Twenty activists met with sympathetic mental health professionals and
attorneys to develop a model civil rights ordinance.306 “Some of those present felt
that words like ‘homosexual’ or ‘sexual orientation’ ought to be used” because
“‘everybody [knew] what they mean[t].’”307 Others worried that an orientationbased approach would inevitably leave many without protection, particularly when
it came to conduct.308 As one attendee explained, “Gay people get hassled not for
what they do in bed, but for publicly expressing their affection—holding hands,
298
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dancing[,] or even for projecting an image which society does not usually associate
with ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’ roles.”309
Ultimately, the attendees settled on a definition first proposed by clinical
psychologist, Gary Schoener, who favored the language of “affectional or sexual
preference.”310 As Schoener saw it, activists should describe bisexuality and
homosexuality as neutral or even positive choices rather than as inborn traits that
victimized those who were not innately heterosexual.311 Schoener worried that
sexual orientation as a category inaccurately suggested “that [one could] be put into
one box based on [one’s] behavior.”312 Attendees also approved of the language
“affectional or sexual preference” because it dignified the relationships of GLBTQ
couples and highlighted the non-sexual dimensions of those relationships.313
After prevailing in the Twin Cities, GLBTQ activists successfully pushed for
city-level referenda in over nine other cities.314 Some cities, like Detroit, developed
laws focused on sexual orientation.315 Other cities used sexual preference as an
alternative framework.316
Ultimately, the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF, then the
National Gay Task Force), the group working to coordinate the campaign for civilrights ordinances at the national level, adopted a strategy based on sexual or
affectional preference.317 NGLTF hoped that the push for local antidiscrimination
ordinances would set the stage for a federal civil rights bill.318 Believing that
sexuality was fixed at birth and could not be changed, most of the organization’s
male leaders favored the rhetoric of orientation.319 Women in NGLTF, however,
argued that preference language was both broader and more affirming, legitimizing
the very conduct that New York legislators had found unacceptable.320 Ultimately,
leaders of the group decided that preference language better served the movement’s
goals for several reasons.321
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First, the language of preference seemed to make a cleaner break with
arguments about dysfunction and mental illness still circulating in the psychiatric
community. Avoiding stigma mattered particularly to lesbian feminists, many of
whom had long used to the language of sexual preference to fend off attacks by
some other members of the women’s liberation movement.322
Moreover, movement leaders believed that preference language promised
broader protection than did the rhetoric of orientation. As the New York
experience indicated, some lawmakers facing orientation bans still claimed the
authority to discriminate on the basis of conduct.323 In other cities, the conductorientation distinction posed a similar risk. In Ann Arbor, Michigan, when
prosecutors pursued a lesbian couple observed dancing at a night club, local
prosecutors denied that they discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation.324
Assistant District Attorney Edward Pear explained, “It was our feeling that it was
their conduct that was unacceptable.”325
Sometimes, movement leaders also hoped that sexual preference laws would
protect those targeted because of gender non-conformity.326 When Boulder,
Colorado, considered a civil-rights ordinance, a sociologist testifying in favor of the
measure implied that the reform would help anyone targeted on the basis of
orientation-based stereotyping.327
NGLTF leaders promoted city ordinances as a way of building support for an
amendment to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 that would protect gays and
lesbians.328 In 1974, Representative Bella Abzug (D-NY) introduced a bill
amending Title VII to protect against discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual
orientation, or marital status.329 Because of the threat of conduct-based
discrimination, Minnesota activists urged Abzug to change the bill to cover “sexual
or affectional preference” rather than an immutable orientation.330 “Please amend
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your bill to recognize that physical intimacy is only one[,] albeit important[,] part
of human affections,” argued Michael McConnell, another Minnesota advocate.331
“Holding hands and other public expressions of [a]ffection cost more jobs than
private sexual [behavior].”332
NGLTF, leader Bruce Voeller travelled to Washington, DC, to ask Abzug to
change the bill’s language.333 Voeller “very strong[ly]” urged Abzug to frame
sexuality as a matter of “affectional [or sexual] preference” instead of an immutable
orientation.334 In explaining his reasoning, he emphasized that sexual orientation
laws left some without protection.335 He cited a case from Minneapolis-St. Paul in
which police officers had harassed a couple for holding hands.336 Since these men
were targeted because of their conduct, Voeller argued that “under the pharse [sic]
‘sexual orientation’ it would not be clear that they would be protected from
harassment.”337
Although Abzug’s proposal never made it out of committee, in 1977, when
Representative Ed Koch (D-NY) again introduced a gay-rights amendment to
Title VII, activists in the NGLTF and an allied organization, the Gay Rights
National Lobby (GRNL), continued depending on the language of “affectional or
sexual preference.”338

B. The Movement Turns Again to a Sexual-Orientation Frame
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, movement leaders concluded that the costs of
a sexual-preference frame were simply too high. At a time when public tolerance of
homosexuality was limited, the recently mobilized Religious Right happily
described homosexuality as a bad choice, rather than an immutable trait.339 After
the
start
of
the
AIDS
epidemic,
when
anti-gay activists denounced what they described as inappropriate behavior choices,
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GLBTQ activists had yet another reason for relying on the language of sexual
orientation.340
The downsides of a sexual preference frame first came into view in June 1977,
when Miami voters decided to repeal an antidiscrimination ordinance by a 2-1
margin.341 Anita Bryant, a former beauty queen and religious conservative, claimed
victory in Miami as the result of a strategy centered on the idea that sexuality was
freely chosen.342 If homosexuality was a mere preference, Bryant asserted that the
risk of gays and lesbians “converting” children was all too real.343 As Bryant told the
New York Times in March 1977, “What these people really want . . . is the legal
right to propose to our children that there is an acceptable alternate way of life—
that being a homosexual or lesbian is not really wrong.”344 NGLTF members
worried that Bryant had exposed the weaknesses of the organization’s existing
strategy.345 Voeller suggested that NGTF “pull away from ‘right to choose’
[arguments] in the short term.”346 The Anita Bryant controversy had exposed some
of the risks posed by a preference-based definition. If Bryant stoked fears about the
spread of homosexuality, choice arguments could only exacerbate the problem.347
“‘Right of Choice’ is not a rallying point,” one board member reasoned. “People
[think they] have a right to try to prevent children from being homosexual.”348
As an emerging Religious Right and New Right coalition attacked other civil
rights ordinances, concern about a preference frame intensified. In St. Paul,
Minnesota, Reverend Richard Angwin, a fundamentalist preacher from Kansas,
headed the repeal campaign.349 Angwin used the idea of sexual preference to argue
for repeal.350 “[B]eing a pervert is like being a thief,” Angwin explained,351 “[B]oth

340
See RIMMERMAN, supra note 340, at 132–33(“AIDS represented divine and just retribution for
immoral homosexual behavior.”).
341
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342
See RIMMERMAN, supra note 340, at 127; WILLIAMS, supra note 340, at 147–50.
343
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at 56.
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are wrong and both can continue or repent.”352 Angwin’s supporters carried the day.
St. Paul voted to repeal its ordinance by a vote of 54,096 to 31, 694.353
Religious Right groups mounted signature petition drives in Wichita, Kansas,
and Eugene, Oregon.354 In both cities, local pastors argued that homosexuality was
an illegitimate preference.355 Reverend Ron Adrian, the head of Concerned
Citizens for Community Standards in Wichita, rejected the idea that the ordinance
had anything to do with civil rights.356 “We think it’s an effort on the part of a
small group of people to ask us to approve of their immoral lifestyle,” Adrian
asserted.357 Rosalie Butler, a sympathizer of the Religious Right and a member of
the St. Paul City Council, backed Adrian’s assessment.358 “Those who choose a
perverted lifestyle, whether it be as a homosexual, robber or drug pusher, can’t
expect the full rights . . . that people who live in step with society get,” she
explained.359
Arguments about immoral preferences apparently spoke to voters in Wichita
and Eugene. On May 10, Reverend Adrian celebrated a huge margin of victory in
Wichita, with voters repealing the city’s ordinance by a margin of 47,246 to
10,005.360 Barely more than two weeks later, a partial tally in Eugene showed that
13,838 voters preferred repeal, with only 7,685 in opposition.361
In the wake of these defeats, NGLTF downplayed a preference frame so much
that Lesbian Tide, a movement publication, accused NGLTF of “call[ing] for an
end to choice.”362 Instead of refuting this charge, NGLTF leaders sent a letter
“clarifying its position . . . reiterat[ing that] ‘sexual preference’ and ‘orientation’ [are
both] useful terms to different segments of the community.”363
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The AIDS epidemic offered another powerful reason to move away from the
language of sexual preference. After 1981, when the New York Times first reported
on the spread of AIDS,364 the number of patients increased rapidly, nearly tripling
between 1982 and 1983 alone.365
The federal government responded slowly, forcing local GLBTQ groups to
pick up the slack.366 Even when Congress appropriated money for AIDS research
for the first time in 1983, President Reagan threatened to veto a bill that would
have dedicated only $12 million for addressing the epidemic.367
Beyond governmental neglect, examples of discrimination against gays and
lesbians proliferated. Conservative writer William Buckley proposed that people
with AIDS be tattooed so that others could easily avoid them.368 In 1985,
Congressman William Dannemeyer (R-CA) proposed a series of bills that would
make it a felony for any person with AIDS to give blood, deny federal funds to
cities that did not close down gay bathhouses, and prohibit persons with AIDS
from either working in the health care industry or attending public schools.369 Even
cosmopolitan cities like New York and San Francisco shuttered bath houses rather
than focusing on education about safe sex.370
Religious right activists used the idea of sexual preference to justify
anti-gay bias. In testifying before Congress, Reverend Charles McIlhenny, a
California-based anti-gay activist, argued that “homosexuality [was] not caused by
a constitutional genetic, glandular, or hormonal factor,” but rather “a learned
364
See Lawrence K. Altman, Rare Cancer Seen in 41 Homosexuals, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 1981),
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/03/us/rare-cancer-seen-in-41-homosexuals.html
[https://perma.cc/295K-FPQW].
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to 2,807 cases in 1983).
366
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behavior.”371 If gays and lesbians made a voluntary choice, McIlhenny argued that
they could not be true victims of discrimination: “Granting special legislation to
groups because of behavior—let alone immoral behavior—opens the floodgates to
almost any group that wants minority status.”372
At the national level, Religious Right figures echoed this reasoning. In
opposing an amendment to the Civil Rights Act, Connie Marshner, a leader of the
New Right and Religious Right, contended that privacy rights militated against
protections for gays and lesbians.373 “What we are advocating,” she explained, “is
that our right to privacy be respected: That the homosexual lifestyle not be flaunted
in our neighborhood and shouted from the housetops.”374 The opposition made
sexual preference arguments shorthand for the selfishness of which Religious Right
activists accused gay men.375
The politics of AIDS reinforced social conservatives’ efforts to equate
selfishness and sexual preference. Judy Welton of Parents United Because
Legislators Ignore Children (PUBLIC), a group that campaigned for the expulsion
of infected children from public schools, argued against increased funding for
research, public education, or drug trials related to AIDS.376 Framing sexuality as a
mere preference, Welton argued that gay men and lesbians put their wellbeing
above everyone else’s.377 “What kind of compassion,” she asked, “allows a disease
such as AIDS to go on, knowing the causes are selfish, immoral behavior
patterns?”378
Dannemeyer, one of the most visible anti-gay leaders, happily discussed the
idea of sexual preference.379 In response to accusations of bigotry, Dannemeyer
wrote to the Los Angeles Times, “Whether the public health response to AIDS
should be compromised because of the perceived sensitivities of the male
homosexual community, or whether gay rights should be given ‘equal treatment,’
comes down to basic value choices in a free society,” Dannemeyer stated. “I speak
for those who favor traditional family values.”380
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Leaders of the NGLTF responded that sexual orientation discrimination, not
sexual preference discrimination, was the real issue. In renewing the push for
federal civil rights legislation, GRNL created a public education campaign to
“analyze current barriers in public thinking to the enactment of effective public
policy measures ending discrimination based on sexual orientation” and “[t]o
educate the public on the nature of homosexuality.”381 Recognizing the downsides
of sexual preference arguments, members of the group planned to “counter”
special-preference claims.382 To do so, GRNL almost exclusively used the language
of orientation. “Our goal,” the group stated, “[is] equal rights and justice under the
law regardless of sexual orientation.”383 In testifying in favor of an amendment to
Title VII, Jean O’Leary, then a member of GRNL, also insisted civil rights
protections were “not designed to approve a lifestyle or create a special minority—
but simply to prohibit discrimination . . . based on sexual orientation.”384
NGLTF also cast aside sexual-preference rhetoric. In lobbying inside and
outside of Congress, the organization convinced the Mayors’ Conference to
“[r]ecogniz[e] the right of all citizens, regardless of sexual orientation, to full
participation in American society.”385 AIDS and the discrimination it unleashed
bolstered arguments about sexual orientation discrimination. As NGLTF argued in
the period, “90% of lesbians and gay men have been victimized at some point in
their lives solely because of their sexual orientation.”386

C. Orientation, Suspect Classification, and the Courts
As GLBTQ activists renewed the push for protection in the Supreme Court,
activists again gravitated toward the language of sexual orientation. As the
381
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movement explored arguments that sexual orientation was a suspect classification,
it became more important to describe sexual identities and behaviors as
unchangeable. In the 1986 case, Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court rejected
an argument that the due process right to privacy extended to consensual adult
intimacy.387 When Bowers temporarily seemed to foreclose a privacy strategy,
movement attorneys began experimenting more vigorously with alternatives.388
While continuing to push privacy arguments in state court, movement lawyers
began putting more emphasis on claims that sexual orientation was a suspect
classification, much like race.389
The language of sexual orientation has become a cornerstone of progressive
arguments for GLBTQ equality—a way of maximizing support for the cause and
strengthening equal-protection arguments in the courts. By contrast, those
skeptical of the GLBTQ movement draw on the language of sexual preference to
challenge both legal and political demands for equal treatment. This political
alignment now seems natural, but the politics and law of defining sexuality have
changed significantly over time. In the 1970s, leading activists stayed away from
the rhetoric of sexual orientation. Groups at the state and federal level argued that
orientation-based definitions offered too little protection. Only after the AIDS
epidemic and the rise of the Religious Right did arguments about sexual preference
come to seem a staple of social conservatism advocacy. As this history shows, sexual
orientation as a legal category has had multiple, conflicting meanings, some of
which have been used to limit demands for equal treatment. Part III turns to the
definition of sexual orientation adopted in Obergefell before exploring its potential
shortcomings.
III. IMMUTABILITY, EQUALITY, AND THE LEGACY OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The meaning of sexual orientation—or even the proper understanding of
homosexuality—is not fully addressed in either the majority or dissenting opinions
in Obergefell. Nevertheless, the majority opinion adopts an understanding of sexual
orientation reminiscent of the definitions long advanced by GLBTQ groups.
Obergefell first mentions sexual orientation in support of the majority’s “history
of marriage” as a story “of both continuity and change.”390 After describing an
emerging tolerance for gay and lesbian relationships, the Court explains, “Only in
more recent years have psychiatrists and others recognized that sexual orientation is
both a normal expression of human sexuality and immutable.”391 In support of this
definition, Obergefell cited an amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of the
387
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American Psychological Association (APA) and other mental health
organizations.392 Significantly, however, the Court’s definition of sexual orientation
differed substantially from the account given by the APA. In its brief, the APA
described sexual orientation as “normal,” “generally not chosen,” and “highly
resistant to change.”393 The Obergefell Court deliberately frames sexual orientation
as unchangeable and never chosen, core dimensions of a definition missing from
the APA’s own analysis.394
On paper, at least, GLBTQ attorneys won—and not just on the issue of
marriage access. By describing sexual orientation as immutable, the Court seems
more likely to recognize sexual orientation as a suspect classification. Rhetorically,
the Court appears to have framed the issue in a way long urged by same-sex
couples. Observers could be forgiven for believing that Obergefell represents only
the first step in the recognition of equal treatment for gays, lesbians, and other
non-conforming individuals.
However, when put in the context of the history of sexual orientation as a legal
category, Obergefell’s definition of sexual orientation offers as much reason for
caution as for celebration. As movement leaders realized over the course of several
decades, sexual orientation as a concept had not one meaning but many, and those
defending anti-gay laws successfully enlisted sexual-orientation reasoning in
defending the status quo. Drawing on the history of sexual orientation arguments,
this Part next considers several of the risks associated with Obergefell’s definition
of sexual orientation.

A. Immutability, Conduct, and Status
Much has changed since the 1970s, as the Obergefell opinion itself recognized.
Nevertheless, immutability-based definitions carry some of the same risks
recognized by activists in the 1960s and beyond. In the context of public
accommodations and same-sex marriage, business owners have claimed to be
discriminating on the basis of conduct rather than an immutable status.395 These
claims have failed so far because the courts reject a distinction based on sexual
orientation “when the conduct [at issue] is so closely correlated with the status that
it is engaged in exclusively or predominantly by persons who have that particular
status.”396
For example, in Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., a same-sex couple visited
a Colorado baker and requested a cake for their upcoming wedding.397 When the
392
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proprietor refused, the couple brought suit under a state public accommodations
law outlawing sexual orientation discrimination.398 The baker responded that the
business acted not “because of” the couple’s sexual orientation but rather “‘because
of’ [the couple’s] intended conduct—entering into marriage with a same-sex
partner—and the celebratory message about same-sex marriage that baking a
wedding cake would convey.”399
The court concluded that the couple’s conduct and status were too closely
intertwined to be distinguishable.400 Similarly, in Elane Photography v. Willock, a
suit challenging the application of a state civil-rights statute to a photographer who
refused service to a same-sex couple, the court similarly concluded that the act of
marriage was “inextricably tied” to sexual orientation itself.401
Precedent offers some guidance as to when conduct and status cannot be
separated. In Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California,
Hastings v. Martinez, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an “all
comers” policy, recognizing only those student groups that opened leadership and
membership to any student.402 The Christian Legal Society (CLS) argued that
Hastings’ policy violated the First Amendment’s guarantees of free association and
free speech.403 The case was governed by the Supreme Court’s limited public forum
doctrine.404 Under the First Amendment, the Court has held that if a governmental
entity opens property under its control, any speech restriction has to be viewpoint
neutral and reasonable.405
In evaluating the reasonableness of Hastings’ policy, the Court considered the
relationship between Hastings’ non-discrimination rules and the all-comers
policy.406 CLS argued that it sought to exclude students not because of their sexual
orientation but because GLBTQ students did not morally object to gay and lesbian
sex.407 The Court rejected this distinction.408 Objecting to gay and lesbian sex—a
behavior identified exclusively with gays, lesbians, and bisexuals—was the same
thing as objecting to sexual orientation.409
398
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The conduct-status distinction worked much more effectively in
Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Clinic.410 In that case, the respondents sought to
enjoin protests by Operation Rescue, a group organizing anti-blockades, under
Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.411 To establish a conspiracy under this
statute, the respondents had to argue that the blockaders shared a discriminatory
animus against a protected class.412 By opposing abortion, a procedure performed
only upon women, Operation Rescue supposedly discriminated against women
because of their status.413 The Bray Court refused to equate the conduct of
opposing abortion and animus toward women as a group.414 “Whatever one thinks
of abortion,” the Court explained, “it cannot be denied that there are common and
respectable reasons for opposing it, other than hatred of, or condescension toward
(or indeed any view at all concerning), women as a class—as is evident from the
fact that men and women are on both sides of the issue, just as men and women are
on both sides of petitioners’ unlawful demonstrations.”415
The Court also rejected the conduct-status argument in the context of sex and
abortion. Because only women could get pregnant and have abortions, Alexandria
Women’s Clinic argued that opposition to women’s conduct in choosing abortion
could not be separated from their status as women.416 The majority was
unconvinced, reasoning that the clinic could not show a discriminatory purpose
unless a party “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group.”417 Because the Court saw opposition to abortion as legitimate, it seemed
unreasonable to equate sex discrimination and antiabortion activism. As the Court
explained, “Whether one agrees or disagrees with the goal of preventing abortion,
that goal in itself . . . does not remotely qualify for such harsh description, and for
such derogatory association with racism.”418
In spite of the failed use of the conduct-status distinction in a handful of cases,
the history of sexual orientation as a legal category, together with the Court’s case
law on the subject, should give us pause. There is no obvious way to determine
when conduct is so closely related to status that someone can discriminate on the
basis of either one. The Supreme Court has been less willing to equate conduct and
status when discriminators invoke what the courts describe as a legitimate moral or
religious objection to a particular act, like abortion. In seeking to respect and
dignify
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conscience-based objections to abortion, the Bray Court readily distinguished
objections to conduct and status-based discrimination.
In describing homosexuality as a sexual orientation rather than partly as a
legitimate choice, the Obergefell Court assumes the validity of moral objections to
both same-sex marriage and homosexuality. “Many who deem same-sex marriage
to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here,” the
majority explains.419 Indeed, the Obergefell Court goes out of its way to reiterate
that the “First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and individuals are
given proper protection.”420 As Bray instructs, the Court may more often
countenance conduct-based discrimination when the justices assume the legitimacy
of objections to that conduct.
Immutability-based definitions of sexual orientation do not effectively address
these moral objections. Activists using these arguments argued that religious and
moral opposition to homosexuality was irrelevant more than indefensible. If no one
could choose a sexual orientation, moral opposition was simply beside the point.
Rather than describing gay and lesbian relationships as a defensible choice to which
few could legitimately object, immutability arguments can be easily be squared with
the belief that business owners and lawmakers have cognizable conscience-based
objections.
This approach to sexual orientation is neither necessary nor unavoidable. Prior
to Obergefell, courts often concluded that same-sex marriage bans had no rational
basis, reasoning that these laws rested on pure animus toward gays and lesbians.421
These decisions offered a way to talk about objections to same-sex marriage or
homosexuality that does not assume the legitimacy of conscience-based objections
to serving gays and lesbians or refraining from discriminating against them.
In the future, as courts face new conscience-based challenges, it is worth
remembering that immutability-based definitions of sexual orientation make it
much harder to explain why gays and lesbians’ interests in civil rights outweigh
religious- or expression-based hostility to sexual orientation. Notwithstanding
language in Obergefell, it is not too late to define sexual orientation in a different
way.

B. Sexual Orientation, Biological Differences, and Reasoning from Race and Sex
Bray also serves as a reminder of how immutability arguments have backfired
for gays and lesbians when the issue of reproduction comes into play. In the context
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of sex, immutability arguments allowed the Court to justify pregnancy
discrimination case law based on sex equality and reproduction. The idea of real,
biological differences between the sexes was at the heart of the distinction drawn by
the Court. Historically, courts hostile to equality for gays and lesbians have invoked
reproduction-based, biological distinctions to justify discriminatory treatment. In
the aftermath of Obergefell, reproductive capacity will not justify bans on same-sex
marriage. Nevertheless, with Geduldig and Bray still on the books, it remains to be
seen whether the Court will revive the idea of biological differences in areas more
closely related to reproduction, particularly access to reproductive technologies.
Sexual orientation as a legal category has a long and complex history, serving
the purposes of both opponents and proponents of civil rights for gays and lesbians.
Nothing in Obergefell or the cases on the conduct-status distinction illuminates
which of those aims the idea of sexual orientation will serve in the future. In the
aftermath of the Court’s decision, it will be just as important to promote a proper
understanding of sexual orientation as it will to be to convince the Court that
sexual-orientation classifications are suspect.
CONCLUSION
While current scholarship explores possible constitutional approaches to
sexual-orientation discrimination, the origins of sexual orientation as a legal
category remain obscure. Other scholars have created a rich and impressive
dialogue about the history of the law and politics of sexuality, but existing studies
only touch on how and why sexual orientation emerged as a legal category. This
Article contributes to the discussion by offering a more complete history, showing
how even skeptical gay and lesbian activists gravitated toward arguments based on
biological difference and immutability. This idea of sexual orientation provoked
controversy, encouraging some movement members to reject related approaches
altogether. In response to a hostile political climate, movement leaders returned to
this definition. The Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence also made
immutability-driven approaches more strategically advantageous.
Nevertheless, there was and is nothing inevitable about the rise of this
definition of sexual orientation. Other definitions—based partly on individual
choice—captured the attention of the movement and even some lawmakers.
Obergefell hints that a majority on the Court is prepared to accept a definition of
sexual orientation that has made it harder to defuse conscience-based objections,
refute conduct-based discrimination, and reject “real differences” arguments based
on reproductive capacity. As history shows, we can do better.

